Introduction
The standard full-information non-cooperative bargaining model is due to the seminal work of Rubinstein (1982) . This model has been used widely in applications and has spawned a large body of theoretical literature. Despite the popularity and importance of the Rubinstein model, there have been few attempts to generalize the assumptions about the payo¤ set. I present a framework, which allows to generalize these assumptions, and state the necessary and su¢ cient conditions on the payo¤ set that guarantee that a unique equilibrium exists. The standard assumption is that the payo¤ set is convex. This assumption restricts applications since many bargaining situations involve non-convex payo¤ sets and players usually have no access to randomization devices so that they cannot propose lotteries.
Example 1 Consider the provision of a public good. For example, consider two institutions that organize a joint event and bargain about how much e¤ ort each has to put forth or spouses who bargain how to share the housework. Suppose that the public good yields a payo¤ of one, that the total e¤ ort that is necessary for provision is one, and that the disutility of e¤ ort e i for player i is p e i . The payo¤ of player i is p i = 1 p e i with e 1 + e 2 = 1. Note that e¢ ciency requires that only one player contributes to the public good. The payo¤ set is non-convex and the Pareto-frontier is given by p 2 (p 1 ) = 1 p 2p 1 p 2 1 with p 1 2 [0; 1].
Example 2 Non-convex payo¤ sets are common when players bargain over multi-dimensional issues and the payo¤ is not continuous in some dimensions. Consider two …rms which use di¤ erent technologies. Firms bargain about which technology is adopted as industry standard and about how to split the market. Payo¤ is linear in market shares x. If the technology of …rm i is adopted, …rm i's payo¤ increases by 1. For simplicity, suppose that the second technology is more e¢ cient and that payo¤ s are p 1 = 1 + x 1 and p 2 = x 2 if the technology of …rm 1 is adopted and p 1 = 1:4x 1 and p 2 = 1 + 1:4x 2 if the technology of …rm 2 is adopted. The payo¤ set is non-convex and the Pareto-frontier is not continuous.
Example 3 Consider a country that has defaulted and that now bargains with a bank about how much of the debt is forgiven and how much has to be repaid. For sovereign debt, collateral is usually negligible. Instead, the reputation of countries and banks a¤ ect the decision to default. If a bank has a reputation as a tough negotiator, countries have less incentives to default and the expected future payo¤ of the bank is higher. Let the country be player 1 and the bank be player 2.
Suppose p 1 = x and p 2 = x + f (x) where x is the amount that is repaid and f captures the e¤ ect of the bargaining outcome on the bank's reputation (i.e., on its future payo¤ s) with f 0 > 0. If the marginal e¤ ect on the reputation is increasing (f 00 > 0), the payo¤ set is non-convex.
These examples are not covered by regular bargaining theory because the payo¤ sets are nonconvex. Theorem 1(i) shows that these bargaining games have a unique equilibrium. Example 3 shows that the payo¤ set can be non-convex although players bargain over money. Other examples where the payo¤ set can be non-convex although side-payments are possible are players with interdependent preferences (e.g. Lopomo and Ok (2001) ) or situations where money and the good in the original bargaining problem are strict complements.
While there exists an extensive literature that analyzes di¤erent o¤er structures (e.g., Perry and Reny (1993), Binmore (1987a)), bargaining over multiple issues (e.g., Inderst (2000) and literature cited therein) or when players can leave the negotiations (Ponsati and Sakovics (1998)), there have been few attempts to generalize conditions on the payo¤ set that ensure uniqueness. Binmore (1994) states a necessary condition for uniqueness of the equilibrium when the time between o¤ers approaches zero. Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky (1986) show that for convex payo¤ sets the equilibrium of the Rubinstein game converges to the Nash-bargaining solution (NBS) as the time between o¤ers approaches zero (see also Binmore (1987b) ). There is no obvious way to extend the NBS to non-convex payo¤ sets. Conley and Wilkie (1996) use a geometric construction to de…ne an extension of the NBS. Their extension selects a unique payo¤ combination that satis…es a desired set of axioms. Conley and Wilkie (1995) propose a non-cooperative game that implements their extension. O¤ the equilibrium path, their game makes use of lotteries. However, this extension is not supported by the equilibrium of the Rubinstein model. Herrero (1989) considers payo¤ sets with continuous and downward sloping Pareto frontiers and de…nes an extension of the NBS using an axiomatic characterization. Depending on the payo¤ set, this extension can take on a large number of values. As the time between o¤ers approaches zero, the set of equilibria of the Rubinstein model converges to the set of extended Nash-solutions as de…ned by Herrero. I de…ne the extension of the NBS as the set of payo¤ combinations that are the global maximizers of the weighted product of the payo¤s. This extension is a subset of Herrero's solution. To avoid confusion, hereafter NBS refers to the set of global maximizers.
Section 2 introduces the model and summarizes the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for uniqueness of the equilibrium if the time between o¤ers is constant. Section 3 states su¢ cient conditions for uniqueness when the time between o¤ers is not constant. Section 4 discusses extensions of the model.
Conditions for Uniqueness when the Time between O¤ers is Constant
Two players bargain over a set P 2 R 2 of feasible payo¤ combinations. Players alternate in proposing an allocation. The …rst p 2 P which is proposed by one player and accepted by the other is implemented and payo¤s are realized. Player 1 starts and makes the …rst o¤er. Player 2 receives this o¤er at 4t. Player 2 chooses to either accept or reject the o¤er. If he accepts, the game is over and payo¤s are realized; if he rejects, he makes a countero¤er to player 1. Player 1 receives this o¤er at 24t and either accepts or makes a countero¤er and so on. Players discount future payo¤s with interest rates 1 ; 2 > 0. Let i be the discount factor of player i, with i = e i4t . A player cannot be forced to agree, so players might disagree perpetually. In this case players receive a payo¤ of zero. As usual, equilibrium existence requires that a player accepts if he is indi¤erent. I assume that P is closed and bounded and that there exists a p 2 P with p 0. 1 The maximum payo¤ which player i can obtain is
The value c i (p j ) is the maximum payo¤ player i can obtain if he o¤ers at least p j to player j.
The function c i is de…ned for all p j 2 [0; p j ]. Note that it is possible that there exists p j such that
I use iterated conditional dominance to prove the uniqueness of the equilibrium. To do so, I
de…ne for each player i acceptance and rejection levels a 
and let a 1 i and r 1 i be the limit of (a Lemma 1 For player i it is conditionally dominated to reject an o¤ er that gives him a payo¤ greater than a 1 i and to accept an o¤ er that gives him a payo¤ less than r 1 i .
All proofs are relegated to the appendix. Binmore et al. (1986) show for convex payo¤ sets that the equilibrium of the Rubinstein bargaining game converges to the NBS as the time between o¤ers approaches zero. For convex payo¤ sets, the NBS is the payo¤ combination that maximizes the product of the payo¤s. I extend this de…nition to non-convex payo¤ sets. While originally proposed as a symmetric solution, weights (which usually correspond to the players'interest rates) were introduced to capture the 1 The vector inequalities are represented by , >, and . Below, I de…ne a collection P of payo¤ sets such that whenever P 2 P , the NBS is unique and the Rubinstein bargaining game has a unique equilibrium. Most of the bargaining literature imposes one of two restrictions: that the payo¤ set is convex (for non-cooperative bargaining)
or d-comprehensive (for cooperative bargaining). I follow a di¤erent approach. Instead of using topological restictions, I de…ne a collection of payo¤ sets in terms of c 1 . Besides being the only tractable way of describing the collection of all payo¤ sets for which the equilibrium is unique, this approach has another advantage. In applications of bargaining theory it is not always straightforward to describe the payo¤ set. But c 1 is usually easy to compute because it is derived from a simple maximization problem.
De…nition Given a bargaining game with constant time between o¤ ers and discount factors
. For closed and bounded payo¤ sets P with c i right-continuous at zero, let P be the collection of P with
Besides containing all convex payo¤ sets, the collection P contains some non-convex payo¤ sets, disconnected payo¤ sets, and payo¤ sets with discontinuous Pareto frontiers. The quasiconcavity condition implies that c 1 is not too convex. In fact, c 1 being strictly -concave is su¢ cient (but not necessary) to guarantee the uniqueness of the equilibrium.
Theorem 1 (4t constant) (i) If P 2 P , the payo¤ of player one is the same under all strategy pro…les that survive iterated conditional dominance. If P 2 P and c
, a unique strategy pro…le survives iterated conditional dominance.
(ii) If P 2 P , then as 4t ! 0 a unique strategy pro…le survives iterated conditional dominance and equilibrium payo¤ s are given by the Nash bargaining solution.
(iii) As 4t ! 0, a unique strategy pro…les survives iterated conditional dominance if and only if P 2 P .
Shaked and Sutton (1984) develop a simple method to compute the equilibrium in the Rubinstein bargaining game when the Pareto frontier is linear. When the SPNE is stationary, player 1 makes the same o¤er in every odd period. Let M be the payo¤ of player 1 if 2 accepts. Therefore, 2 o¤ers in every even period M to 1 and gets the remaining payo¤. Hence, 1 o¤ers in odd periods the discounted payo¤ 2 would get when 2's o¤er would be accepted. The remaining payo¤ for 1 if 2 accepts is equal to M . The equilibrium is unique whenever there is a unique M that satis…es this relation which is true i¤ 2 c 2 ( 1 c 1 ) has a unique …xed point. Since this proof relies on the stationarity of the equilibrium, it cannot be used when the time between o¤ers is not constant even when the Pareto-frontier is linear.
Uniqueness when the Time between O¤ers is not Constant
In many circumstances under which people bargain, the time between o¤ers is not constant.
For example, consider boards that have to approve o¤ers but that do not meet at night or on holidays. In applications, constant time between o¤ers is a convenient assumption, especially if it allows to compute explicit payo¤s. However, to justify this assumption, it is necessary to know under which conditions a unique equilibrium exists when the time between o¤ers is not constant.
Let 4 t be the lenght of period t, i.e. 4 t is the di¤erence between the time when the t-th o¤er is received and the time when it is made by the other player. Let t i be the corresponding discount factor with t i = e i4t . When the time between o¤ers is not constant, de…ne for all t; t + 1 with t even the NBS: When the time between o¤ers is not constant, it is possible to provide limits for the equilibrium payo¤s but not to compute explicit equlibrium payo¤s. As 4t ! 0 the equilibrium payo¤ of player
and similar for player 2.
Generalizations
In many situations, players receive some income ‡ow or incur some cost during the bargaining (e.g. strike pay, cost of negotiations). Furthermore, players do not always know when the other player will receive the o¤er or when the other player will be able to respond. In this case, the time between o¤ers is random. Additonally, in many situations it is possible that the bargaining opportunity disappears or that the bargaining process breaks down.
In this section, I generalize the Rubinstein bargaining model to account for these possibilities.
The analysis of bargaining games with income ‡ows and the possibility of a breakdown is not new (see Muthoo (1999) is positive. During one unit of time the bargaining process breaks down with probability 1 .
In this case, both players get their breakdown payo¤s b 1 and b 2 . The expected payo¤ for player i from the breakdown of the bargaining between t k and t k + k is:
where z is the probability that the bargaining did not break down between time t k and t k + z and ln is the instantaneous probability of a breakdown. During the bargaining process, players receive an income ‡ow 1 and 2 . The expected payo¤ of player i from the income ‡ow between t k and t k + k discounted to t k is:
The expected payo¤ of a player is the sum of his expected payo¤s from the income ‡ow, the breakdown payo¤ and the implemented o¤er p. If players disagree forever, they receive as long as the bargaining process does not break down plus b when the bargaining breaks down. Let s i denote the expected disagreement payo¤ of player i:
I assume that there exists a p 2 P with p s. If player i o¤ers p at time t s to player j the expression "the payo¤ of j from p" refers to the payo¤ player j gets at t s+1 from accepting p but does not include earlier income ‡ows. For
i be discounted value of an o¤er of 1 in period k when income ‡ow and breakdown payo¤s are not taken into account, i.e.
The discount factor consists of two terms, the usual discounting term e t , and the probability t that the bargaining process does not break down before t. The discount factor captures the two motives to reach an agreement: impatience and the fear that the bargaining opportunity might disappear. Similar to the case when breakdown payo¤s and income ‡ows are zero, I de…ne acceptance and rejection levels which depend on the round of elimination:
When income ‡ows or breakdown payo¤s are non-zero, the expressions for a and 2 , let (P; ; b) be the bargaining game with payo¤ set P , income ‡ow , and breakdown payo¤ b. Strategies can be described by a cut-o¤ payo¤ such that a player accepts or rejects an o¤er and by the payo¤ that a player o¤ers to the other player. Given (P; ; b), let f ( (P; ; b)) be the set of strategies that survive iterated conditional dominance. Lemma 2 shows that it is possible to normalize income ‡ows and breakdown payo¤s to zero and that it is su¢ cient to prove uniqueness and to compute equilibrium strategies for the simpler game where = b = 0.
Lemma 2 If 4t is constant and P s 2 P , then f ( (P; ; b)) = f ( (P s ; 0; 0)) + s. For 4t not constant, if P s 2 P 8 2 [ ; ] and if there exists " > 0 such that c 1 is strictly -concave for all
Note that payo¤ set and the functions c 1 ; c 2 are normalized but that discount factors in (P s ; 0; 0) are the same as in (P; ; b).
Conclusions
This to analyze bargaining games where the payo¤ set changes over time.
Appendix
Lemma 1 For player i it is conditionally dominated to reject an o¤ er that gives him a payo¤ greater than a 1 i and to accept an o¤ er that gives him a payo¤ less than r 1 i .
Proof. Since zero is the minimax payo¤, it is strictly dominated to accept an o¤er which yields less than zero. Player 1 makes the …rst o¤er. The discounted maximum payo¤ that player 2 can obtain when he rejects the o¤er is 2 p 2 . Hence, for player 2 it is conditionally dominated to reject an o¤er where p 2 > a Before I prove Theorem 1, I introduce two de…nitions that are used in the proofs. To show that the function 1 c 1 ( 2 c 2 ) has a unique …xed point and that (a .
A positive-valued function g with convex domain X is -concave for 6 = 0 and j j < 1 if 8x 1 ; x 2 2 X and 2 (0; 1)
The function g is strictly -concave (exactly -concave) if the inequality holds strictly (with equality).
De…nition Given 0 < 1 ; 2 < 1, let V be the family of all v : R + nf0g ! R + nf0g with > 0 and
Note that 2 v 1 ( 1 v (x)) = x, that v is exactly -concave, and that [v (x)] x = .
(iii) As 4t ! 0, a unique strategy pro…les survives iterated conditional dominance if and only if P 2 P . 1 ) has at least one …xed point. If P 2 P , the function
Proof. (i) The function
twice. Let p f be an arbitrary …xed point of 2 c 2 ( 1 c 1 ). Note that P 2 P implies that c i is right-continuous at zero and, therefore, c i (
The range of c 2 is a subset of [0; p 2 ]. Hence, p f 2 p 2 . Recall that v : R + nf0g ! R + nf0g. For an arbitrary < , let p a = min fpjv (p a ) = c 1 (p a )g. By construction, c 1 is weakly decreasing. Therefore, P 2 P implies that c 1 is continuous for p < b p. Since c 1 (0) = p 1 and
Since P is closed, from the de…nition of c 1 follows 
, and c 
In both cases 2 c 2 ( 1 c 1 (e p f )) = e p f and, therefore, e p f = p f , i.e., e p f is the unique …xed point
non-decreasing and has a unique …xed point p f we have 2 c 2 ( 1 c 1 (p)) > p for 0 p < p f and 2 c 2 ( 1 c 1 (p)) < p for p f < p p 2 . Hence (r n 2 ) and (a n 2 ) converge to p f . Note that r
and a
). Hence, (r n 1 ) and (a n 1 ) converge to 1 c 1 (p f ).
From Lemma 1 follows that it is conditionally dominated for player 2 to reject (accept) an o¤er where p 2 > p f (p 2 < p f ). Therefore, it is conditionally dominated for player 1 to accept (reject) an o¤er where
Hence, it is conditionally dominated for player 2 to o¤er
Additionally, it is conditionally dominated for player 1 to o¤er p 2 < p f or p 2 such that c 1 (p 2 ) < c 1 (p f ). Since c i is weakly decreasing, this implies that in all equilibria, the payo¤ of player 1 is
there is a trade-o¤ between the payo¤ of player 1 and 2. Therefore, the equilibrium is unique if c
(ii) Convergence to NBS:
Note that does not depend on 4t. Let p f (4t) be the …xed point of 2 c 2 ( 1 c 1 ) as a function (iii) In part (ii), I have shown that in the limit as 4t ! 0 the equilibrium converges to the NBS, i.e. that the equilibrium is unique. It remains to show that as 4t ! 0 at least two equilibria exist if P = 2 P . The set of subgame perfect Nash-equilibria (SPNE) is a subset of the set of strategy pro…les that survive iterated conditional dominance. Therefore, it is su¢ cient to show that at least two SPNE exist if P = 2 P . I show …rst that at least two SPNE exist if c i is not right-continuous at zero and then that at least two SPNE exist if c 1 (p 2 ) p 2 is not strictly quasiconcave.
If c i is not right-continuous at zero, then c i (0) > c
exist. In the …rst SPNE, player i o¤ers 0 and rejects any o¤er that yields him less than p i . Player j o¤ers p i and accepts any o¤er. In the second SPNE corresponds to the NBS.
If c 1 (p 2 ) p 2 is not strictly quasiconcave, there are two possible cases. 
Therefore, for all 4t < 4t e " with e " 2 (0; 4t), the function 2 c 2 (
has a continuum of …xed points in the interval (a; b). Let p f 1 and p f 2 denote two …xed points of 2 c 2 ( 1 c 1 ) with p f 1 6 = p f 2 . For 4t < 4t e " there exists a continuum of SPNE where each SPNE corresponds to a …xed point. Note that 4t > 0 if a < b. As 4t ! 0, the minimum lenght of I such that a continuum of …xed points exists, goes to zero. Hence, as 4t ! 0, a continuum of equilibria exist whenever a < b, i.e., whenever c 1 (p 2 ) p 2 is quasiconcave but not strictly quasiconcave. and let 4t = min 4t 1 , 4t 2 . Similar to the argument in part (i)
there exists e > 0 and intervals I 1 and I 2 such that 4t > 0. Hence, in the limit as 4t ! 0, at least two …xed points p f 1 and p f 2 exist. Therefore, whenever c 1 (p 2 ) p 2 is not quasiconcave, at least two SPNE exist: player 1 o¤ers p f 1 (p f 2 ) and rejects any o¤er less than 1 c 1 (p f 1 ) ( 1 c 1 (p f 2 )) and accepts otherwise. Player 2 o¤ers 1 c 1 (p f 1 ) ( 1 c 1 (p f 2 )) and rejects any o¤er less than p f 1 (p f 2 ) and accepts otherwise.
The following technical Lemma about -concave functions is needed to prove Theorem 2.
Lemma A1 (i) Let x 1 6 = x 2 and y 1 ; y 2 > 0 be given. For all 6 = 0, j j < 1, there exists a unique exactly -concave function g with g(x) = (dx + k) 1 such that g(x 1 ) = y 1 and g(x 2 ) = y 2 .
(ii) If g is exactly -concave and g is not constant, then the inverse g 1 exists. If g is exactly -concave with g(x) = (dx + k)
If g is exactly -concave and f is strictly -concave and if there exists x 1 ; x 2 with x 1 < x 2 and g(x 1 ) = f (x 1 ) and g(x 2 ) = f (x 2 ),
(iv) If g 1 and g 2 are exactly -concave and if there exists
and
(v) Let g 1 and g 2 be exactly -concave and strictly decreasing functions with < 0 and
for i 2 f1; 2g. If there exists x r < x c such that g 1 (x c ) = g 2 (x c ) and g 1 (x r ) < g 2 (x r ), then there exists 4 > 0 such that
Note that if g is exactly (strictly) -concave, then g is a¢ ne (strictly concave). Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 1(i), I show that (r n 2 ) and (a n 2 ) converge to the same limit. As shown in the proof of Theorem 1(i), whenever P 2 P , the function 2 c 2 (
. Note that p f is a function of the discount factors. Since
, for all t even, the …xed point of for all p 2 I " . Since there exists n such that r n 2 2 I " and a n 2 2 I " , it is su¢ cient to show that the sequences (r n 2 ) and (a n 2 ) converge to the same limit given that r n 2 2 I " and a )))) and so on, and that = . De…ne g a in the same way such that g a intersects c 1 at a and, similarly, a . Since c 1 is strictly decreasing for p min I " , we know that g r and g a are strictly decreasing. Since g(p) = (dp + k) ). Since g is exactly -concave, g is continuous. Therefore, there exists a unique p c 2 r Hence, whenever r n 2 2 I " and a n 2 2 I " we have a n+1 2 r n+1 2 < a n 2 r n 2 4(1 2 ). As shown above, there exists n such that r n 2 2 I " , a n 2 2 I " . Therefore, (a Since both (a -concave for all p 2 I " (if 4t not constant), then (r n i ) and (a n i ) of (P s ; 0; 0) converge to the same limit (Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, respectively). Hence, (r n i ) and (a n i ) of (P; ; b) converge to the same limit and the limits r 1 i = a 1 i of (P; ; b) and (P s ; 0; 0) di¤er by s i . Hence, the set of strategies that survive iterated conditional dominance di¤ers by the constant s.
